# The US automotive product pipeline 

 Car Wars 2017-2020
## In-depth study of the US automotive product pipeline

Car Wars is an annual proprietary study that assesses the relative strength of each automaker's product pipeline in the US. The purpose is to quantify industry product trends and then relate our findings to investment decisions.

## Car Wars thesis and investment relevance

We believe that the replacement rate drives showroom age, which drives market share, which in turn drives profits and stock prices. OEMs with the highest replacement rate and youngest relative showroom age have generally gained market share from 2001-16 (Table 1). We expect this relationship to hold over our forecast period of model years 2017-20 (Charts 1 and 2). We also expect that the total industry's profit momentum will be strong as more new models are launched in the next four model years (Chart 3).

## Ten key findings of our study

1. Product activity is relatively solid at major OEMs, which is consistent with the later stages of a cyclical recovery. It should be noted that there is a proliferation of new nameplates in MY2019\&2020 that may result in an increasingly crowded market.
2. New vehicle introductions are overweight in the CUV segment, a phenomenon sweeping the globe. Along with a relatively robust truck pipeline, this should drive a continued positive mix shift through MY2017-20.
3. Convergence of product cycles is intensifying at the majors as the laggards catch up. However, there is some volatility in MY2017-18, where Honda clearly leads.
4. GM product launches for MY2017-20 should drive strong mix, market share and, importantly, pricing, despite the extreme skepticism of investors.
5. Ford's product cadence remains well above average. This along with a richening mix should sustain pricing as Ford focuses on profit and leverages its global platforms.
6. FCA's launch cadence is accelerating materially in MY2017-20. This should bolster market share, but will likely require the support of heavy/burdensome investment.
7. Honda's product cadence remains above average. Toyota and Nissan are just below the industry average. The somewhat middling position of the J 3 in total is a result of a relative resurgence of the D3 and their strength in trucks. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that the J3 will cede material market share over the next four years.
8. European OEMs in total are at the low end of the range with the largest component Volkswagen below the industry average and extremely overweight cars.
9. Hyundai and Kia have a relatively light cadence for MY2017-20. Combined with a concentration on small cars, this creates material risk to market share.
10. Suppliers are likely to benefit from the convergence of product cycles as OEMs turn to them for differentiated content and features. Dealers should benefit from the continued industry-wide stream of great product that draws consumers into showrooms and supports demand.

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Refer to important disclosures on page 38 to 39.

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| Table 1: Replacement rate, showroom age, market share (MY2001-2016) |  |  |  |
|  | Avg. <br> Replacement Rate ${ }^{[1]}$ | Avg. <br> Showroom Age O/(U) | US Market Share $\Delta^{[2]}$ |
| FCA | 14\% | 0.1 | -0.5\% |
| GM | 14\% | 0.3 | -10.7\% |
| Ford | 14\% | 0.9 | -7.1\% |
| European | 15\% | (0.2) | 2.5\% |
| Industry | 16\% | 0.0 | 0.0\% |
| Nissan | 18\% | (0.3) | 4.4\% |
| Toyota | 18\% | (0.4) | 4.2\% |
| Honda | 20\% | (0.2) | 2.2\% |
| Korean | 21\% | (0.9) | 4.6\% |

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research
[1] Market share is based on calendar years 2000-2015

Chart 1: Replacement rate 2017e-20e ${ }^{[1]}$


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research
[1] Cumulative replacement rate for MY2017-2020

Chart 2: Avg showroom age 2017e-20e


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research
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## Executive summary

Car Wars is a proprietary study we conduct every year to assess the relative strength of each automaker's product pipeline in the US. It was published for the first time in 1991. The study is based on numerous primary and secondary sources, including industry contacts, auto show visits, trade publications, enthusiast magazines, supply chain relationships, our general knowledge of platform strategies, and product cycle planning.

The purpose is to quantify industry product trends and then relate our findings to investment decisions.

The key metrics that we use are the replacement rate (the estimated percentage of an OEM's sales volume to be replaced with new models or next generation models), average showroom age (the number of years on the market for the average design in an OEM's showroom), and new model volume mix (the mix of new models by segment during the forecast period for each OEM).

## Car Wars thesis

We believe that the replacement rate drives showroom age, which drives market share, which in turn drives profits and ultimately stock prices. Table 2 shows the average annual replacement rate, relative showroom age, and market share change of the largest OEMs between MY2001 and MY2016.

Table 2: Historical replacement rate, showroom age, market share (2001-2016)

|  | Avg. Volume Replacement <br> Rate ${ }^{[1]}$ | Avg. Showroom Age O/(U) <br> Industry Avg. | US Market Share <br> $\Delta^{[2]}$ |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| FCA | $14 \%$ | 0.1 | $-0.5 \%$ |
| GM | $14 \%$ | 0.3 | $-10.7 \%$ |
| Ford | $14 \%$ | 0.9 | $-7.1 \%$ |
| European | $15 \%$ | $(0.1)$ | $2.5 \%$ |
| Industry Avg. | $16 \%$ | 0.0 | $0.0 \%$ |
| Nissan | $18 \%$ | $(0.3)$ | $4.4 \%$ |
| Toyota | $18 \%$ | $(0.4)$ | $4.2 \%$ |
| Honda | $20 \%$ | $(0.2)$ | $2.2 \%$ |
| Korean | $21 \%$ | $(0.9)$ | $4.6 \%$ |
| Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research |  |  |  |

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research
[1] Volume weighted average annual replacement rate, [2] Market share change is based on calendar years 2000-2015
Although other factors, including mix, pricing, execution, distribution, and brand power impact market share, we think this data support our thesis that successful new products drive higher market share and profit. Table 3 summarizes our forecasts of these key metrics for MY2017-20 and subsequent estimates of market share shifts. Based on our estimates, convergence is intensifying with the relative resurgence of the Detroit Three, although there is some market share risk at Hyundai/Kia and Volkswagen. As a result, OEMs are likely to add content and features in an attempt to differentiate their product.

Table 3: Forecast replacement rate (MY2017-20e), showroom age (MY2017-20e), and market share change (CY2019 vs. CY2015) -

|  | Replacement Rate ${ }^{11]}$ | Avg. Showroom Age O/(U) | 2015 Market Share | Direction of US Mkt. Share, CY19 vs. CY15 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| GM | 22\% | 0.0 | 17.7\% | $\uparrow$ |
| Ford | 21\% | (0.1) | 14.7\% | + |
| Honda | 21\% | (0.9) | 9.1\% | T |
| FCA | 21\% | 0.7 | 12.8\% | $\longleftrightarrow$ |
| Industry Avg. | 20\% | 0.0 | nm | nm |
| Toyota | 20\% | 0.1 | 14.4\% | $\leftrightarrow$ |
| Nissan | 19\% | 0.2 | 8.5\% | $\longleftrightarrow$ |
| Korean | 19\% | (0.4) | 8.0\% | $\downarrow$ |
| European | 18\% | 0.1 | 8.0\% | $\downarrow$ |

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research
[1] Volume weighted average annual replacement rate, [2] Directional market share forecast is for calendar years 2015 to 2019

## Ten key conclusions

1. Product activity is relatively solid at major OEMs. This is consistent with a cyclical recovery and should support US auto demand. . It should be noted that there is a proliferation of new nameplates in MY2019\&2020 that may result in an increasingly crowded market
2. New vehicle introductions are overweight the CUV segment. Along with a relatively robust truck pipeline, this should drive a continued positive mix shift in MY2017-20.
3. Convergence of product cycles is intensifying as the laggards catch up. There is some volatility in MY2017-18 where Honda clearly leads, but by MY2020 the four year cumulative replacement range will be the tightest ever. At that point the average age will be just 1.9 years with Toyota and Ford at the low end at about 1.7 years and Fiat Chrysler ( 2.1 years) and the Europeans (2.7years) relatively old.
4. GM product launches for MY2017-20 should drive strong mix, market share and, importantly, pricing. Intros are dominated by CUVs in MY20172018 and then trucks in MY2019-202. This strength appears to be extremely underappreciated by the market.
5. Ford's product cadence remains well above average. Although not at the top of the range, Ford's solid product cadence is further building the foundation of long-term success. Ford is also at the forefront of adding advanced features such as ADAS to its "mass market" products.
6. Chrysler's launch cadence is accelerating materially in MY2017-20. This likely bolsters market share, but will require the support of heavy investment. Our concern is that cash flow may fall short of management's ambitious plans and certain products could be delayed.
7. The somewhat middling position of the J 3 in total is a result of a relative resurgence of the D3 and their strength in trucks. Honda's product cadence remains above average. Toyota and Nissan are just below the industry average. In total, it is unlikely that the J3 will cede material market share over the next four years.
8. European OEMs in total are at risk of ceding market share. In total, their replacement rate is at the low end of the range. The largest component Volkswagen is below average and extremely overweight cars.
9. Hyundai and Kia have a relatively light cadence for MY2017-20. Combined with a concentration on small cars, this creates material risk to market share.
10. Suppliers and dealers should benefit from the continued product surge. Suppliers are likely to benefits from the convergence of product cycles as OEMs turn to them for differentiated content and features. Dealers should benefit from the continued industry-wide stream of great product that draws consumers into showrooms and supports demand.

## Car Wars background

## The purpose of Car Wars

## Background and purpose

Purpose of report: quantify industry product trends, market share shifts, and then relate conclusions to investment decisions.

Car Wars is a proprietary study we conduct every year to assess the relative strength of each automaker's product pipeline in the US. It was first published in 1991. The study is based on numerous primary and secondary sources, including industry contacts, auto show visits, trade publications, enthusiast magazines, supply chain relationships, our general knowledge of platform strategies, and product cycle planning.

The purpose of the report is to quantify industry product trends and then relate findings to investment decisions.

## Key metrics

Replacement rate, average showroom age, and new model volume mix are the key metrics we calculate to analyze the OEMs' product pipeline.

The key metrics that we use include the following:

- Replacement rate. One of the simplest and most important ways to measure the strength of an automaker's product plan: the estimated percentage of its sales volume to be replaced with entirely new models or next generations of existing models.
- Average showroom age. The number of years on the market for the average model in an OEM's showroom (measured on a stand-alone basis and relative to the industry). This is sales volume weighted.
- New model volume mix. The mix of new models by segment during the forecast period for each OEM.

Our data collection is continuous, and we have developed a comprehensive database of US product activity going back to 1987 - through two cycle peaks and now two troughs. Once a year, we summarize our findings in a report and on a color poster. This year's study forecasts activity for the 2017-20 model years (2016-19 calendar years).

## An independent view

## Relative performance is what counts

Car Wars represents our independent view of automakers' competitiveness, so it does not necessarily agree with the views of the car companies. It is likely we are missing information on all OEMs. Therefore, despite differences of opinion on any one OEM's pipeline forecast, we believe that we have an accurate view of its relative position in the market; and in our view, that is what matters when forecasting market share.

## "All-new" versus "new and improved"

Readers may find that our data might differ from the announcements OEMs make occasionally about the number of products they plan to launch. This is because our definition of a new product may differ from that of automakers. (New product definitions even vary from company to company.) In Car Wars, we include only products we judge to be all-new or next-generation vehicles - what the industry typically calls a major. We do not include mid-cycle enhancements, where only modest changes are
made to the vehicle, but do concede there is an increasing focus by many OEMs to make more substantial mid-cycle enhancements that could create some distortions. In addition, we forecast volume based on what we think the average annual volume will be for the product over its entire model life. We do not use company sales targets or peak volumes, which could distort results. Importantly, the sum of our volume forecasts is limited to rational trend levels of US demand.

## Car Wars thesis

Replacement rate $\rightarrow$ showroom age $\rightarrow$ market share $\rightarrow$ profits $\rightarrow$ share price Our thesis is that an OEM's product replacement rate drives showroom age, which drives market share, which in turn drives profits and stock prices. Table 4 shows the average annual replacement rate, relative showroom age, and market share change of the largest OEMs between model years 2001 and 2016. The table shows how the OEMs with the highest replacement rate and youngest showroom age relative to the industry have generally gained market share. Although other factors, including mix, pricing, execution, distribution, brand power, and unforeseen disruptions impact market share, we think this data support our thesis that successful new products drive higher market shares.

Table 4: Historical replacement rate, showroom age, market share (MY2001-2016)

|  | Avg. Volume Replacement <br> Rate ${ }^{[1]}$ | Avg. Showroom Age O/(U) <br> Industry Avg. | US Market Share |
| :--- | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| FCA | $14 \%$ | 0.1 | $\Delta^{[2]}$ |
| GM | $14 \%$ | 0.3 | $-0.5 \%$ |
| Ford | $14 \%$ | 0.9 | $-10.7 \%$ |
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| Industry Avg. | $16 \%$ | 0.0 | $2.5 \%$ |
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| Korean | $21 \%$ | $(0.9)$ | $2.2 \%$ |
|  |  |  | $4.6 \%$ |

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research
[1] Volume weighted average annual replacement rate
[2] Market share change is based on calendar years 2000-2015
Based on the relative strength of this historical relationship, and taking mix and strategy into account, we forecast directional market share shifts for the major automakers in the US market relative to 2015 levels, which is summarized in Table 5. We will discuss the implications of these shifts in the following sections. Based on our estimates, it appears that the large market share shifts that occurred in the last decade are unlikely to continue. This will likely drive automakers to add content and features in an attempt to differentiate product, which should be positive for both suppliers and consumers.

Table 5: Forecast replacement rate (MY2017-20e), showroom age (MY2017-20e), and market share change (CY2019 vs. CY2015)

|  | Replacement Rate ${ }^{[1]}$ | Avg. Showroom Age O/(U) | 2015 Market Share | Direction of US Mkt. Share, CY19 vs. CY15 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| GM | 22\% | 0.0 | 17.7\% | + |
| Ford | 21\% | (0.1) | 14.7\% |  |
| Honda | 21\% | (0.9) | 9.1\% | 1 |
| FCA | 21\% | 0.7 | 12.8\% | $\longleftrightarrow$ |
| Industry Avg. | 20\% | 0.0 | nm | nm |
| Toyota | 20\% | 0.1 | 14.4\% | $\longleftrightarrow$ |
| Nissan | 19\% | 0.2 | 8.5\% | $\longleftrightarrow$ |
| Korean | 19\% | (0.4) | 8.0\% | $\downarrow$ |
| European | 18\% | 0.1 | 8.0\% | $\downarrow$ |
| Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research |  |  |  |  |

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research
[1] Volume weighted average annual replacement rate, [2] Directional market share forecast is for calendar years 2015 to 2019

## Industry \& manufacturer trends

## Industry \& manufacturer trends Industry trends

This section details product trends for the US auto market. The size, homogeneity, relatively rich mix, and the profitability of the US market continue to attract new investments. The accelerating boom of new model launches in the mid-2000s took a slight breather from model years 2009-14, but appears to be accelerating as the recovery takes hold and competition intensifies.

New model launch activity solid after a lull
As shown in Chart 3, we expect OEMs to launch 231 new models during our forecast period (MY2017-20), or an average of 58 per year. This rate is about $49 \%$ above the average number of models launched per year between 1997 and 2016, underscoring that competition is hot and should support demand. However, it should be noted that the extreme levels in MY2019 \& 2020 are also a result of nameplates splintering.

Chart 3: New model launches 2017e-2020e


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research
There are many factors contributing to the acceleration in product, including OEMs' rush to enter new vehicle segments (CUVs, hybrids, ultra-luxury, etc.), an aggressive push by some OEMs to expand product line-ups (e.g., Chrysler following the Fiat combination), as well as the relative richness and size of the US vehicle market. This is helping to drive an industry product pipeline that is overweight the CUV and light truck segments, which should drive a positive mix shift in MY2017-20 (Chart 4).

Chart 4: 2017e-20e new vehicle launch mix vs. 2007-16


[^0]Replacement rate remains high in MY2017-2020
The replacement rate mirrors the trend in new model launches to a large degree. On average, between 1997 and 2016 the industry replaced about $16 \%$ of its volume each year with new models. At this rate, the industry turns over its entire model line about every 6 years. Over the next four years, we expect the annual replacement rate will trend higher at about 20\%, above the historical average level. New volume mix is moving toward CUVs, representing about 31\% of new volume launched from MY2017 to MY2020.

In our opinion, the continued strong pace of product activity can be linked to the competitive environment and demand recovery. As with all industries, auto companies can compete through cost leadership, superior product, or product differentiation. For most OEMs, the first strategy has been unachievable, and with the reorganized and restructured Detroit Three it is even tougher to differentiate on cost.

On the second strategy, there has been extreme convergence in quality as all automakers have improved to a relatively common level. That leaves almost all trying to compete by differentiating product. This has resulted in the strengthening pace of new model introductions. As automakers have benefited from the strength of the cycle, more are aiming to spur demand by launching fresh product with increased content rather than discounting stale models at the expense of margins. Obviously this is still a very competitive environment, but it is far better as supply and demand are much more balanced across the industry.

Chart 5: Replacement rate


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

## Average showroom age remains low across the board

The age of vehicles on sale in showrooms across the US (Chart 6 on the following page) has been on a steady decline since the early 1990s, as automakers replace aging products more frequently. We attribute this trend to intensifying competition - in part from new entrants - and product line expansion by car companies that have introduced numerous new nameplates. We expect that the industry's average showroom age will trend lower, averaging about 2.7 years for model years 2017-20, a tick down from an average age of 3.0 years for the last decade.

Chart 6: Average showroom age ${ }^{[1]}$


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research
[1] Average is volume weighted
Intensified competition and the resulting new products are, of course, beneficial for consumers, who will enjoy the choice of new cars and trucks. However, this new product comes at a high cost to the OEMs, which will need to increasingly leverage global platforms and simplify product offerings to remain efficient and competitive. Although industrywide pricing has been challenged in the past, a relative level of price stability has emerged, as supply and demand are much more closely balanced.

## New model segment shift toward Trucks and CUVs

Charts 7 and 8 show the US market's evolving market shift, based on the number of new models and volume, from traditional Small, Midsize and Large cars to Light Trucks and Crossovers.

Since the MY1997 launch of the Toyota RAV4 and the Honda CR-V, Crossovers have been the fastest growing vehicle segment, which may accelerate in the upcoming model years. 73 of the 231 new models we forecast for 2017-2020, or $31 \%$, will be Crossovers. The extreme focus ranges from more mainstream Detroit Three and Japanese OEM models to numerous new German luxury CUVs such as the Porsche Macan.

Chart 7: 2017e-20e launch mix vs. 2007-16 by volume


[^1]Chart 8: New models by segment, simple vehicle count


[^2]
## Manufacturer trends

Average showroom age converging around 2.7 years for the next four years Average showroom age is one way to quantify how intensely competitive the US market has become in the last two decades (Chart 9). Since at least the late 1980s, there has been a significant convergence in average showroom age. We expect an increasing convergence in average showroom age to around 2.7 years, with only slight outliers on either end of the spectrum (FCA at 3.4 years and Honda at 1.8 years).

Chart 9: Average showroom age by OEM


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Cumulative replacement rates appear to drive market share
Comparing cumulative replacement rates is one of the simplest and most effective ways in which we measure the strength of product plan. The replacement rate is the estimated percentage of sales volume to be replaced with entirely new models or nextgeneration existing models during the period.

Over the next four years, we estimate the industry will replace $81 \%$ of its volume based on 2015 industry volumes. We estimate that a relatively low level of disparity in replacement rates will result in smaller market share shifts in the future. This differs greatly from the last few decades, when large shifts were the norm.

Chart 10: Cumulative replacement rates, \% of 2015 CY volume replaced in MY 2017e-20e


[^3]
## Near-term dynamics imply potential volatility

The next two model years, 2017 and 2018, lead to different conclusions than our typical four year forecast window, and could result in some volatility for the following reasons:

- Honda's refresh rate is incredibly high due to important launches, including CR-V, Odyssey, and Accord.
- GM's refresh rate appears strong, but is even better given the onslaught of new Crossover models including the GMC Acadia, Terrain, Cadillac XT5, Chevrolet Traverse, Equinox, Buick Envision, and Envision.
- Ford's replacement rate appears low for MY2017\&2018, which is the result of large volume programs in the last two years (F-150, Edge).
- Toyota had a relatively big MY2016 so MY2017 is subsequently soft, but its replacement rate accelerates meaningfully in MY2018 and beyond.
- Hyundai and Kia's replacement rate was strong in MY2015 \& 2016, but fades dramatically in MY2017-19 and then re-accelerates somewhat in MY2020. In addition, a concentration in small car introductions may pressure market share.

Chart 11: 2-year cumulative replacement rates, \% of 2015 CY volume replaced in MY17e-18e


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

## Company analysis

## General Motors Company

Conclusion: We forecast GM's product cadence to remain solid in model years 20172020 as the company launches a dozen new CUVs and its next-gen trucks. There is a slight slow start in MY2017 and then there is a surge of product with all-important nameplates like the Chevrolet Traverse and Equinox in MY2018. There is further follow through in MY2019 with the all new Chevrolet Silverado and GMC Sierra and in MY2020 with the full slate of large SUVs. The acceleration of the truck launch by at least one year appears to be a response to competitive pressures. In total, we expect product activity to support market share and pricing proving the skeptics wrong.

GM's replacement rate should average about $88 \%$ over the next four years, which is above the industry average.

Chart 12: GM replacement rate vs. industry


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

GM's launch mix is skewed toward trucks due to the acceleration of the large pickup launch in MY2019 and SUVs in 2020. However, prior to that, CUVs dominate new launches, including a dozen over the next four years.

Chart 13: New model volume mix


[^4]Relative showroom age hovers around the industry average as GM focuses on a more streamlined brand portfolio. This should bode well for market share and pricing at least through MY2020.

Chart 14: Average showroom age (years)


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Table 6: General Motors US product pipeline 2017e-20e

| 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| GMC Acadia - Mid CUV | Chevrolet Traverse - Mid CUV | Cadillac XT7 - Mid Lux CUV | Cadillac XT3 - Small Lux CUV |
| Cadillac XT5 - Small Lux CUV | Buick Enclave - Mid Lux CUV | Cadillac XT4 - Mid Lux CUV | GMC B-CUV - Small CUV |
| Buick Envision - Small Lux CUV | GMC Terrain - Small CUV | Buick Encore - Small Lux CUV | Chevrolet Silverado HD - Large Pickup |
| Buick LaCrosse - Sedan | Chevrolet Equinox - Small CUV | Chevrolet Silverado - Large Pickup | GMC Sierra HD - Large Pickup |
| Cadillac CT6-Sedan | Buick Park Avenue - Sedan | GMC Sierra - Large Pickup | Chevrolet Tahoe - Large SUV |
| Buick Cascada - Convertible |  | Cadillac CT4-Sedan | Chevrolet Suburban - Large SUV |
| Chevrolet Bolt - Hatchback |  | Chevrolet Corvette Zora - Coupe \& Convertible | GMC Yukon - Large SUV <br> GMC Yukon XL - Large SUV <br> Cadillac Escalade - Large Lux SUV <br> Chevrolet Sonic - Sedan \& Hatchback |
| \% of volume replaced: 11\% | \% of volume replaced : 20\% | \% of volume replaced : $29 \%$ | \% of volume replaced : $28 \%$ |

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Exhibit 1: 2017 GMC Acadia


Source: General Motors

Exhibit 2: 2017 Chevrolet Bolt


Source: General Motors

## Ford Motor Company

Conclusion: Ford's product cadence is relatively robust with a concentration of truck and CUV launches that combined should sustain market share, mix, and price. Increasingly leveraging global platforms has enabled Ford to maintain a relatively consistent product cadence that should support share. However, as management remains focused on maximizing profit, market share may be traded for higher prices/profits.

Ford's estimated replacement rate for MY2017-20 is $86 \%$, which is above the industry average of $81 \%$.

Chart 15: Replacement rate


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Ford's replacement is OK in MY 2017 and 2018, but accelerates meaningfully in MY2019-2020. In the first two years Ford is somewhat overweight cars, but in the last two there is an extreme shift towards CUVs and trucks that should drive materially improved mix.

Chart 16: New model volume mix


[^5]Ford's average age has dropped just below the industry average and should stay there at least through MY2O20 as it simplifies its product cadence and leverages global platforms.

Chart 17: Average showroom age (years)


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Table 7: Ford US product pipeline 2017e-20e

| 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| F-Series Super Duty - Large Pickup | Ford Expedition - Large SUV | Lincoln Aviator - Large Lux CUV | Ford EcoSport - Mid CUV |
| Lincoln Continental - Sedan | Lincoln Navigator - Large Lux SUV | Ford Explorer - Large CUV | Ford F-150-Large Pickup |
| Ford GT - Coupe | Lincoln MKA - Sedan | Ford Escape - Mid CUV | Ford Transit Connect - Van |
|  | Lincoln MKM - Coupe | Lincoln MKC - Small Lux CUV | Ford Bronco - Mid SUV |
|  | Ford Focus - Sedan | Ford C-Max - Small CUV | Lincoln MKZ - Sedan |
|  | Ford Fiesta - Sedan \& Hatchback | Ford Ranger - Small Pickup |  |
|  |  | Ford Taurus - Sedan |  |
| \% of volume replaced : 11\% | \% of volume replaced : 14\% | \% of volume replaced : 35\% | \% of volume replaced : $26 \%$ |

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Exhibit 3: 2017 Ford Super Duty


Source: Ford Motor Company

Exhibit 4: 2017 Lincoln Continental


Source: Ford Motor Company

## Fiat Chrysler Automobiles

Conclusion: FCA has relatively successfully worked through a lull in its product cadence, which should accelerate materially MY2017-20. If this is funded as planned, it should support market share and improve mix materially. The Pacifica (MY2017), Ram pickup (MY2018) and Wrangler (MY2018) launches skew mix toward Light Trucks. In addition, FCA is also over indexed to CUVs with 9 launches. This bodes well for mix for years to come.

FCA's average replacement rate over the next four model years is about $84 \%$, which is above the industry average of $81 \%$.

Chart 18: Replacement rate


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Not surprisingly, FCA's mix is skewed toward trucks as a result of the minivan launch in MY2017, as well as the Ram pickup and Wrangler in MY2018. Nine CUV launches spread across FCA's brands also drive a small overweight in CUVs while cars are becoming an afterthought.

Chart 19: New model volume mix


[^6]FCA's average showroom age is currently well above the industry average. However, with major launches in MY2017-18 it will drop much closer to the industry average at the end of our forecast window. This is a result of the replacement of older models like the Ram pickup, Wrangler, and minivans.

Chart 20: Average showroom age (years)


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Table 8: FCA US product pipeline 2017e-2020e

| 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Alfa Romeo Stelvio - Mid CUV | Jeep Compatriot - Small CUV | Jeep Grand Wagoneer - Large CUV | Dodge Durango - Large CUV |
| Maserati Levante - Mid Lux CUV | Alfa Romeo Small CUV - Small CUV | Jeep Grand Cherokee - Large CUV | Jeep Cherokee - Mid CUV |
| Chrysler Pacifica - Minivan | Ram 1500 - Large Pickup | Chrysler E-CUV - Large CUV | Ram Full-Size SUV - Large SUV |
| Alfa Romeo Giulia - Sedan | Jeep Wrangler - Mid SUV | Ram 2500/3500 - Large Pickup | Alfa Romeo Spider - Coupe \& Convertible |
|  |  | Alfa Romeo Giulietta - Hatchback | Dodge Challenger - Coupe |
|  |  | Chrysler 300 - Sedan | Dodge Charger - Coupe |
|  |  | Chrysler 200 - Sedan | Fiat 500 - Hatchback |
| \% of volume replaced : 11\% | \% of volume replaced : 27\% | \% of volume replaced : 26\% | \% of volume replaced : 20\% |

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Exhibit 5: 2018 Jeep Wrangler (2016 75 ${ }^{\text {th }}$ Anniversary Wrangler Unlimited shown)


Source: FCA US LLC

Exhibit 6: 2017 Chrysler Pacifica


Source: FCA US LLC

## Toyota Motor Corporation

Conclusion: Toyota on average is just below the industry average refresh rate, which combined with a new cadence that is a bit car heavy could put the company at some risk. However, with almost half its new introductions under the Lexus brand there is somewhat of an offset. In addition, high volume nameplates such as the Camry (MY18), RAV4 (MY19), Tundra (MY19), Corolla (MY20), and Highlander (MY20) should support market share,

Toyota's replacement should average about 79\% over the next four years, which is just below the industry average of $81 \%$.

Chart 21: Replacement rate


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Toyota's new model mix is skewed toward mid/large cars over the next four years due to the launch of the Camry (MY2018) and Avalon (MY2019). It is also slightly over indexed to small cars because of the launch of the Corolla (MY2020) and Yaris (MY2019).

Chart 22: New model volume mix


[^7]Toyota's strong historical cadence and consistency over the next four years should keep its average age around the increasingly competitive industry average.

Chart 23: Average showroom age (years)


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Table 9: Toyota product pipeline 2017e-20e

| 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Toyota C-HR - Small CUV | Toyota 4Runner - Mid SUV | Toyota RAV4 - Small CUV | Toyota Highlander - Mid CUV |
| Lexus LC500 - Coupe | Lexus LS - Sedan | Toyota Tundra - Large Pickup | Lexus NX - Mid Lux CUV |
|  | Toyota Camry - Sedan | Toyota Sienna - Minivan | Toyota Sequoia - Large SUV |
|  |  | Lexus GX - Mid Lux SUV | Toyota Land Cruiser - Large SUV |
|  |  | Lexus ES - Sedan | Lexus LX - Large Lux SUV |
|  |  | Lexus CT - Hatchback | Lexus GS - Sedan |
|  |  | Toyota Avalon - Sedan | Lexus IS - Coupe, Sedan \& Convertible |
|  |  | Toyota Yaris - Hatchback \& Sedan | Toyota Corolla - Sedan |
| \% of volume replaced : 1\% | \% of volume replaced : 21\% | \% of volume replaced: $30 \%$ | \% of volume replaced : 27\% |

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Exhibit 7: 2017 Toyota C-HR


Source: Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.

Exhibit 8: 2018 Toyota Camry (Special Edition shown)


Source: Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. Inc.

## Honda Motor Company

Conclusion: Honda retains one of the highest replacement rates over the next four years, which should at least support market share. Honda is still largely at the sweet spot in its product cycle, but the Civic was launched last year and will not likely reappear as a new model again until $2021+$. Honda's consistent focus on a well-plannedout, 4-5 year product redesign cycle on a simplified two-brand lineup sets it apart from most automakers.

Honda's average replacement rate of $85 \%$ over MY17-20 is above the industry average of $81 \%$.

Chart 24: Replacement rate


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Honda's new product is skewed toward small and mid-size cars, compared to the richer, more truck-heavy industry mix, which could be a risk over the next four years.

Chart 25: New model volume mix


[^8]Honda's focused product cadence keeps its showroom age one of the freshest in the industry.

Chart 26: Average showroom age (years)


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Table 10: Honda product pipeline 2017e-20e

| 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Honda CR-V - Small CUV | Acura RDX - Small CUV | Acura MDX - Mid CUV | Acura ILX - Sedan |
| Honda Ridgeline - Small Pickup | Acura CDX - Compact CUV | Acura RLX - Sedan | Honda Civic - Hatchback, Coupe \& Sedan |
| Honda Odyssey - Minivan | Honda Accord - Sedan \& Coupe | Acura TLX - Coupe \& Sedan | Honda Fit - Hatchback |
| Acura NSX - Coupe | Honda CR-Z - Hatchback | Honda Insight - Hatchback |  |
| Honda Clarity - Coupe |  |  |  |
| \% of volume replaced : 29\% | \% of volume replaced : 26\% | \% of volume replaced : 7\% | \% of volume replaced : 24\% |

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Exhibit 9: 2017 Honda Ridgeline


Source: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

Exhibit 10: 2017 Honda Odyssey (plug-in hybrid shown)


Source: American Honda Motor Co., Inc.

## Nissan Motor Company

Conclusion: Nissan appears to be recovering to some degree from a lack of product direction, but still appears somewhat lost. Its replacement rate appears to accelerate in MY2019\&2020, but in the interim it is at risk of ceding market share and/or pricing on its products.

Nissan is at risk of losing market share in MY2017-18 as its replacement rate lags the industry, but this may reverse in MY2019-20.

Chart 27: Replacement rate


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Nissan appears to be over indexed to small and mid/large cars, equalweight CUVs, but underweight the profitable truck segment.

Chart 28: New model volume mix


[^9]Nissan's average showroom age begins to trend just above average in MY2017, but dips below in MY2019\&2020 with large launches such as the Altima, Rogue, and Sentra.

Chart 29: Average showroom age (years)


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Table 11: Nissan product pipeline 2017e-20e

| 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Infiniti QX30 - Mid Lux CUV | Nissan Z - Coupe \& Convertible | Nissan Pathfinder - Mid CUV | Infiniti QX80-Large Lux SUV |
| Nissan Micra - Small CUV | Nissan Versa - Hatchback | Infiniti QX70 - Mid Lux CUV | Nissan Quest - Minivan |
| Nissan Armada - Large SUV | Nissan Cube - Hatchback | Infiniti QX60-Mid Lux CUV | Nissan Rogue - Small CUV |
| Infiniti Q60-Sedan |  | Nissan Juke - Small CUV | Infiniti Q50-Coupe \& Sedan |
|  |  | Nissan NV200 - Small Van | Nissan GTR - Coupe |
|  |  | Infiniti Q70-Sedan | Nissan Sentra - Sedan |
|  |  | Nissan Altima - Sedan \& Coupe | Nissan Leaf - Hatchback |
| \% of volume replaced : 5\% | \% of volume replaced : 10\% | \% of volume replaced : 31\% | \% of volume replaced : 29\% |

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Exhibit 11: 2017 Infiniti Q60


[^10]Exhibit 12: 2017 Nissan Armada


[^11]
## European OEMs

Conclusion: We expect market share for European OEMs to slip slightly over the next four years, with an average replacement of $71 \%$, which is below the industry average of $81 \%$. It should be noted that VW is slightly better at about $80 \%$, but with an extreme over indexing to cars (70\%), it appears at risk of losing market share. The German luxury OEMs are mixed.

European OEM average replacement rates are about 70\% over the next four years, below the industry average of $81 \%$.

Chart 30: Replacement rate


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Numerous luxury brands such as Mercedes, BMW, Porsche, and Audi leads to a natural skew toward luxury cars, but there is also a very slight overweighting towards CUVs.

Chart 31: New model volume mix


[^12]European OEMs have an average age of about 2.8 years over the next four years, which is just above the industry average of 2.7 years.

Chart 32: Average showroom age (years)


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Table 12: European OEM product pipeline 2017e-20e

| 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Audi Q5 - Mid Lux CUV | Volkswagen Touareg - Mid CUV | Audi Q8 - Large Lux CUV | Mercedes-Benz GLS - Large Lux CUV |
| Audi Q2 - Compact Lux CUV | Volkswagen CrossBlue - Mid CUV | Audi Q6-Mid Lux CUV | BMW X5 - Mid Lux CUV |
| Mercedes-Benz GLC - Small CUV | Porsche Cayenne - Mid Lux CUV | Mercedes-Benz GLE - Mid Lux CUV | Mercedes-Benz Sprinter - Van |
| Audi A5 - Coupe \& Convertible | Volkswagen Tiguan - Small CUV | Audi Allroad - Small Lux CUV | Audi A3-Sedan \& Wagon |
| Audi A4 - Sedan | BMW X3 - Small Lux CUV | Mercedes-Benz ELC - Small Lux CUV | Mercedes-Benz SL - Convertible |
| Mercedes-Benz E-Class - Sedan | Audi A8-Sedan | MINI Countryman - Small CUV | Mercedes-Benz CLA - Sedan |
| BMW 5-Series - Sedan | Audi A7-Sedan | Audi Q4 - Compact Lux CUV | Porsche Pajun - Sedan |
| Porsche Panamera - Sedan | Audi A6 - Sedan | BMW X7 - Mid Lux SUV | Volkswagen Beetle - Hatchback \& Convertible |
|  | Mercedes-Benz CLS-Class - Sedan | Mercedes-Benz GT-4 - Sedan |  |
|  | Porsche Cayman - Coupe | BMW 6 Series - Coupe \& Convertible |  |
|  | Porsche Boxter - Convertible | BMW 3 Series - Sedan |  |
|  | Volkswagen CC - Sedan | BMW Z4-Convertible |  |
|  | Volkswagen Jetta - Sedan \& Wagon | Porsche 911 - Coupe \& Convertible Volkswagen Passat - Sedan \& Wagon |  |
| \% of volume replaced : 14\% | \% of volume replaced : 22\% | \% of volume replaced : 21\% | \% of volume replaced : 14\% |

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Exhibit 13: 2017 Audi Q2


Source: Audi of America

Exhibit 14: 2017 BMW 5 Series


Source: BMW of North America LLC

## Korean OEMs

Conclusion: Hyundai and Kia fade in MY2017\&2018, but re-accelerate in MY2019\&2020. However, a skew towards Small Cars and Mid/Large Cars creates more risk. In total, we forecast market share erosion over the next four years with risk to pricing.

The average replacement rate of $76 \%$ over the next four years is below the industry average of $81 \%$.

Chart 33: Replacement rate


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Hyundai and Kia's mix is skewed heavily toward small cars and mid/large cars, which exacerbates market share risk as the market is structurally shifting towards CUVs and somewhat to trucks.

Chart 34: New model volume mix


[^13]Average showroom age for Hyundai and Kia should continue to trend somewhat below the industry average, which may be somewhat of a mitigating factor.

Chart 35: Average showroom age (years)


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Table 13: Korean OEMs US product pipeline 2017e-20e

| 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Kia Sportage - Small CUV <br> Kia Niro - Compact CUV <br> Genesis G90 - Sedan <br> Kia Cadenza - Sedan <br> Kia Forte - Sedan <br> Hyundai loniq - Sedan | Hyundai Santa Fe - Mid CUV <br> Hyundai Azera - Sedan <br> Hyundai Accent - Sedan \& Hatchback <br> Hyundai Veloster - Hatchback <br> Kia Rio - Sedan \& Hatchback | Hyundai Santa Fe Sport - Mid CUV <br> Genesis GV90 - Mid Lux CUV <br> Hyundai Santa Cruz - Small Pickup <br> Kia Soul - Hatchback | Genesis G80 - Sedan <br> Hyundai Sonata - Sedan <br> Hyundai Elantra - Sedan |
| \% of volume replaced : 13\% | $\%$ of volume replaced : 10\% | $\%$ of volume replaced : 19\% |  |

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Exhibit 15: 2017 Genesis G90


Source: Hyundai Motor Company

Exhibit 16: 2017 Kia Sportage


Source: Kia Motors America, Inc.

## Other OEMs

Table 14: Other OEMs US product pipeline 2017e-2020e

| 2017e | 2018e | 2019e | 2020e |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Land Rover Discovery - Mid Lux CUV | Subaru XV - Mid CUV | Jaguar I-Pace - Mid Lux CUV | Land Rover Defender - Mid Lux CUV |
| Jaguar F-Pace - Mid Lux CUV | Volvo XC60 - Small CUV | Subaru Crossover 7 - Mid CUV | Mazda CX-5 - Mid CUV |
| Jaguar XE - Coupe \& Convertible | Jaguar E-Pace - Compact Lux CUV | Range Rover Evoque - Small Lux CUV | Mitsubishi Outlander - Small CUV |
| Volvo S90-Sedan | Volvo V90- Wagon | Volvo XC40-Small CUV | Land Rover Range Rover - Large Lux SUV |
| Subaru Impreza - Coupe, Sedan \& Wagon | Mitsubishi Lancer - Sedan | Subaru Forester - Small CUV | Mazda RX-7-Coupe |
|  | Tesla Model 3 - Sedan | Jaguar XJ - Coupe \& Convertible | Tesla Model S - Sedan |
|  |  | Subaru BRZ - Coupe | Volvo V40-Wagon |
|  |  | Volvo S60-Sedan | Volvo S40-Sedan |
|  |  | Volvo V60-Wagon | Subaru WRX - Wagon |
|  |  | Mazda 5 - Wagon | Subaru Legacy - Wagon |

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Exhibit 17: 2018 Tesla Model 3


Source: Tesla Motors

Exhibit 19: 2017 Volvo S90


[^14]Exhibit 18: 2017 Subaru Impreza


Source: Subaru of America, Inc.

Exhibit 20: 2017 Jaguar F-Pace


Source: Jaguar Land Rover North America, LLC

## Implications for suppliers and dealers

## Implications for suppliers

Proprietary technology trumps all for suppliers, in our view, though exposure to profitable and growing OEMs is extremely important for their growth, profitability, and returns.

Proprietary technology trumps all for suppliers, in our view, though exposure to profitable and growing OEMs is extremely important for the growth, profitability, and returns of suppliers. Therefore, assuming all else equal, suppliers most exposed to OEMs with the highest replacement rates and lowest average age are at an advantage. At the highest level this is a positive sign for most Tier I suppliers, whose exposure is relatively diversified (Chart 36).

In addition, with an increasingly competitive OEM landscape and convergence of product cadence, OEMs will likely add content/features to vehicles in an attempt to differentiate their product. This should be a net positive for the suppliers we cover, most notably Delphi.

Chart 36: Supplier exposure to OEMs - 2015


Source: Company filings

## Implications for dealers

Similar to suppliers, and assuming all else equal, dealers that are most exposed to the OEMs with the highest replacement rates and lowest average age are best off.

Similar to suppliers, and assuming all else equal, dealers that are most exposed to the OEMs with the highest replacement rates and lowest average age are best off, in our view. This should translate into better new car sales and earnings growth in the short term, and, importantly, feeds into the recurring parts and service profit stream in the long term as units in operation grow. Chart 37 summarizes the public groups' new vehicle exposures by brand.

Once again, the convergence of product will drive OEMs to try and differentiate their product, which may also occur at the point of sale and increased focus on improving the ongoing customer relationship. This means that the successful dealer may become even more valuable than ever before to OEMs attempting to stand out in a crowded market.

Chart 37: Dealer exposure to OEMs - 2015


Source: Company filings

## Appendix

## Appendix

The mix of industry new model launches varies widely amongst manufacturers, but in total is skewed towards CUVs and trucks. This variation is a result of different points in product cycle cadence, but also in core product architecture competency.

Chart 38: New model volume mix industry summary, 2017e-2020e model year


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

New models continue to comprise a large portion of the total number of models offered in the US. However, a splintering of nameplates in the coming years is partially inflating the number of new model intros in out years.

Chart 39: Total number of models offered in the US market


[^15]Even among the segments there is a general convergence around an average showroom age between two and three years.

Chart 40: Average showroom age by product segment


Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

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